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The result of a study on the use of an array of large anti-neutrino detectors for the purpose of
monitoring rogue nuclear activity is presented. Targeted regional monitoring of a nation bordering
large bodies of water with no pre-existing legal nuclear activity may be possible at a cost of about
several billion dollars, assuming several as-yet-untested schemes pan out in the next two decades.
These are: (1) the enabling of a water-based detector to detect reactor anti-neutrinos by doping
with GdCl3; (2) the deployment of a KamLAND-like detector in a deep-sea environment; and (3)
the scaling of a Super-Kamiokande-like detector to a size of one or more megatons. The first may
well prove feasible, and should be tested by phase-III Super-Kamiokande in the next few years. The
second is more of a challenge, but may well be tested by the Hanohano collaboration in the coming
decade. The third is perhaps the least certain, with no schedule for construction of any such device
in the foreseeable future. In addition to the regional monitoring scheme, several global, untargeted
monitoring schemes were considered. All schemes were found to fail benchmark sensitivity levels by
a wide margin, and to cost at least several trillion dollars.
I. INTRODUCTION
The human race first tapped into nuclear energy with
the success of the Manhattan project. Ever since, the
practical know-how regarding the use of this source of
energy has expanded and spread, and, so far as civiliza-
tion as we know it continues to exist, this, no doubt, will
continue to be the case. The spread of practical know-
how in this area, however, presents a threat to peace,
since there will always be desperate characters among
the world’s political leaders, and it is a matter of time
before one such leader gets access to this know-how and
decides to use it indiscriminately against his enemies.
Monitoring regimes exist to guard against the uncon-
trolled spread of nuclear technology and the detonation
of nuclear bombs. The International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) works under the auspices of the United
Nations to make sure that nations that use nuclear energy
do so only for peaceful purposes [1]. Another monitoring
regime is the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT),
which is an agreement among nations to ban all nuclear
explosions [2]. As recent world events (the detonation
of a fission bomb by Pakistan in 1998, and the current
political crisis involving nuclear activities in North Ko-
rea and Iran) have shown, however, neither regime has
proved sufficient to curb the spread of nuclear technol-
ogy nor the detonation of bombs. Clearly, the flaws in
the regimes are mostly political. For instance, the det-
onation of nuclear bombs by Pakistan in 1998 was not
against the CTBT because Pakistan is not a signatory.
Also, the recent events in North Korea and Iran have lit-
tle to do with monitoring techniques, but, rather, with
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flaws in the political process that allows headstrong polit-
ical leaders to use nuclear threats as political bargaining
chips.
Although much of the problems with today’s moni-
toring regime is political, some of the political prob-
lems are abetted by insufficiencies in the monitoring
techniques. For instance, in 2002, after mounting ten-
sions with the United States and her allies, North Ko-
rea expelled United Nations inspectors and threatened
to restart its nuclear facilities in Yongbyon [3]. Once the
inspectors were ousted, it was impossible to tell whether
or not the North Koreans had actually carried through
with their threat to reprocess nuclear fuel. This scenario
is made possible by the fact that the IAEA monitor-
ing technique requires the cooperation of participants.
Clearly, a more robust monitoring regime requires far-
field monitoring techniques that do not depend on par-
ticipant cooperation.
Such techniques are already in use to monitor nuclear
explosions by the CTBT (seismology, hydroacoustics, in-
frasound, and radionuclide monitoring) [2], but they are
useless for detecting nuclear reactor operation because a
reactor burns nuclear fuel at a steady rate, and it does
not release redionuclides into the environment. Far-field
monitoring, however, is possible in principle using anti-
neutrinos produced in nuclear fission. Indeed, the Kam-
LAND experiment [4] detects anti-neutrinos from nuclear
reactors at an average distance of about 180 km. anti-
neutrinos are electrically neutral particles produced in
nuclear fission; they interact with matter only via the
weak nuclear force. Because of this, anti-neutrinos can
easily travel through hundreds of kilometer of matter
with almost no probability of interaction with the inter-
vening material. This feature of the anti-neutrino makes
its detection very difficult; however, given a big enough
target, a sufficiently long exposure time, and a sufficiently
low background level, they can be reliably detected.
The purpose of the study presented herein is to de-
2termine the feasibility of using anti-neutrino detection
for far-field monitoring of both nuclear reactor operation
and fission bomb detonations. At the most basic level,
the feasibility of this technique has been established by
KamLAND. However, they were helped by the very large
signal due to the unusually large concentration of nuclear
reactors in Japan[16]. In a realistic far-field monitoring
scenario, the signal is expected to be tiny – probably
much less than 100 MWth (a typical commercial nuclear
reactor power is about 2500 MWth). We have found that
a regionally targeted monitoring regime – e.g. the moni-
toring of nuclear reactor operations in North Korea – is
may be possible at a projected cost of several billion dol-
lars, as long as several as-yet-untested schemes pan out in
the coming decade. We also considered the possibility of
setting up a global array of large anti-neutrino detectors
to detect surreptitious nuclear fission activity anywhere
in the world. This was found to miss benchmark sensitiv-
ity levels by a wide margin, and to be unrealistic because
of the prohibitive projected cost on the order of trillions
of dollars.
II. ANTI-NEUTRINOS PRODUCED IN
NUCLEAR FISSION
Nuclear reactors and fission bombs make use of the
energy released by splitting heavy nuclei (primarily ura-
nium and plutonium). The former are designed to keep
the rate of splitting constant so that energy is released
at a steady rate, whereas the latter is designed to cause
the energy to be released in a very short period. In both
cases, the daughter nuclei from the splitting of uranium
and plutonium are unstable and undergo radioactive de-
cay; an anti-neutrino is produced from every beta decay.
The rate of anti-neutrino production in a nuclear re-
actor is directly proportional to its thermal power. Each
nuclear fission releases about 200 MeV (million electron
volts) of thermal energy[17], which is equal to 3.2×10−11
Joules. A typical nuclear reactor has a thermal power of
one gigawatt, or 109 Joules per second. The number of
fissions per second required to produce this power, there-
fore, is 109 J/s divided by 3.2×10−11 J, which is equal to
3.1× 1019. Finally, since about 6 anti-neutrinos are pro-
duced per fission, we find that 1.9 × 1020 anti-neutrinos
per second are produced for every one gigawatt of ther-
mal power.
The corresponding calculation for a fission bomb pro-
ceeds similarly. The strength of a fission bomb is usually
quoted in terms of its “yield”, which is the mass of TNT
that produces the same amount of energy. A small fis-
sion bomb has an yield of about 1000 ton of TNT, and
one metric ton of TNT releases 4.18× 109 Joules, so this
bomb releases 4.18×1012 Joules of energy. As in the case
of a nuclear reactor, each fission releases 200 MeV of en-
ergy, and 6 anti-neutrinos are produced per fission. Thus
1.30× 1023 anti-neutrinos are released for every kilo-ton
of fission bomb yield. Unlike a reactor, which releases
anti-neutrinos at a steady rate, a fission bomb releases
the anti-neutrino impulsively over a period of several sec-
onds; almost no anti-neutrinos are emitted after about 10
seconds from the blast [5].
III. DETECTING ANTI-NEUTRINOS
The stuff that composes the material world is respon-
sive to the electromagnetic force. It is this force that
keeps a ball from going through one’s hand when caught.
anti-neutrinos, unlike ordinary stuff, are unresponsive
to the electromagnetic force. Consequently, an anti-
neutrino can travel through an extraordinary thickness
of matter with almost zero chance of hitting stuff on
its way through; the illustration of a neutrino traveling
through a light-year thick block of lead is famous. They,
however, do interact with matter via the weak nuclear
force. This force has a strength comparable to that of
the electromagnetic force, but the carriers of this force
are very massive, unlike photons, the massless particles
that transmit the electromagnetic force. As a result, the
weak force has a very short range; an anti-neutrino inter-
acts with matter only if it happens to pass by very close
to a target particle. The chance of this happening is ex-
traordinarily low, and this accounts for an anti-neutrino’s
ability to travel through large amount of matter.
The weak interaction between an anti-neutrino and
matter can take place in various ways. For instance, an
anti-neutrino can hit an electron that orbits an atomic
nucleus, transmitting some of its momentum to it. Since
an electron carries an electric charge, its motion through
matter is very noticeable; a sensitive particle detector
can detect the effects produced by this motion. For in-
stance, an electron carrying several million electron-volts
of energy travels faster than the speed of light in matter;
this super-luminal motion creates a shock wave of electro-
magnetic radiation, which is referred to as the Cherenkov
effect. Detectors like Super-Kamiokande [6] detect anti-
neutrinos (and neutrinos) using this effect.
Another way that an anti-neutrino can be detected is
via the inverse beta process, in which an anti-neutrino
encounters a proton and comes out transformed into a
positron, while the proton is transformed into a neutron.
This is written symbolically as follows:
νe + p→ n+ e+ (1)
The symbols νe, p, n, and e
+ stand, respectively, for anti-
neutrino (electron-type), proton, neutron, and positron.
In the study we performed, we considered detectors that
use this process for detecting antineurtrinos. The advan-
tages of this technique are the relatively high probability
of the occurrence or the inverse beta process, and the
“double-bang” signature produced by the anti-neutrino.
That is, the out-going particles e+ and n both produce
signals in the detector. First, the e+ produces a burst
3of light, the amount of which is proportional to its en-
ergy (which is also closely related to the anti-neutrino’s
energy). This happens promptly after the transforma-
tion in Eqn. 1 takes place. The neutron, however, rattles
around for tens to hundreds of microseconds (millionth
of a second, which is a relatively long time in the present
context) until it is eventually absorbed by a proton or a
dopant like gadolinium in the target. This absorption is
followed by the emission of gamma ray(s) of several mil-
lion electron volts; a burst of light proportional to this
energy is produced. In summary, then, an anti-neutrino
interacting in this manner produces two bursts of light
separated by a meter or so in distance, and tens to hun-
dreds of microseconds in time. This double-bang signa-
ture is useful for picking out anti-neutrino events from the
large background produced, for example, by radioactive
contaminants in the detector. The background events
produce random flashes of light, but they are not very
likely to produce the double-bang signature [7].
The detection of anti-neutrinos using inverse beta de-
cay is typically done using a liquid scintillator detector;
KamLAND is an example of such a detector [4]. Liquid
scintillator is used primarily because the amount of light
produced by an anti-neutrino interaction event is very
large compared to Cherenkov radiation produced in wa-
ter; greater light yield translates to higher sensitivity (i.e.
particles with lower energy are visible) and better energy
resolution. In the present context, however, the required
detector size is of the order of one megaton, which, for
liquids, is about a cube of sides 100 m. At this scale, the
use of liquid scintillator becomes impractical because of
the cost; water is the only economically realistic target
material. By itself, however, water cannot be used to
detect the inverse beta decay process because the second
“bang” in the double-bang signature is below the energy
threshold. In order to make the second bang visible, the
detector must be doped with an element such as gadolin-
ium, which aggressively absorbs the produced neutron
and emits gamma rays above the detector energy thresh-
old. Because of the very large absorption cross section for
thermal neutrons, only a 0.2% concentration is needed to
capture 90% of the neutrons. For a 1 megaton detector,
this corresponds to 200 tons of the salt GdCl3 [8].
The rate of detection of anti-neutrinos from a nu-
clear reactor in a water detector is given by the equation
below[18]:
N = 3.04× 103 events (2)
×
(
T
1 year
)
·
(
M
1 Megaton
)
×
(
P
100 MWth
)
·
(
100 km
D
)2
This equation shows that a 100 MWth nuclear reactor
(about the upper limit of the power expected from a
rogue nuclear reactor) at 100 km from a 1-Megaton de-
tector exposed for 1 year produces about 3000 observable
events. The number of anti-neutrino events from a fission
bomb is given by:
N = 2.25 events (3)
×
(
M
1 Megaton
)
·
(
100 km
D
)2
·
(
Y
1 kton
)
Unlike Eqn. 2, which gives the rate of anti-neutrino de-
tection (events per year), Eqn. 3 gives the total anti-
neutrino yield over 10 seconds during which most of the
anti-neutrinos are released by a fission bomb. Based on
this equation, one finds only 2.25 events for a 1 kiloton
bomb detonated at 100 km from a 1-Megaton detector.
This may seem small, but since the events arrive in a 10-
second window, the signal-to-background ratio is actually
quite good. For instance, a 2500 MWth reactor (typical
power of a commercial reactor) 100 km away produces
about 2.5 events in this time window, giving a signal-to-
background ratio close to 1; at most locations, the ratio
is much better than this.
Both Eqn. 2 and Eqn. 3 are somewhat optimistic be-
cause they were calculated assuming that the detector is
sensitive to all values of anti-neutrino energy (the inverse
beta process requires at least 1.8 MeV in anti-neutrino
energy). In reality, the anti-neutrino energy probably
needs to be at least 3.8 MeV to be visible by the detec-
tor. Only 58% of events have energy above this. Other
data selection cuts may decrease the event rate some-
what, probably to a total efficiency of about 50%. For
the sake of simplicity, we shall take the efficiency to be
100%. Any result we obtain here, therefore, will be over-
optimistic by a factor of about
√
0.5. In other words,
the actual sensitivity will be worse by about a factor of√
2 ≈ 1.4.
IV. SHIELDING FROM COSMIC RAYS
Because anti-neutrinos interact very rarely with mat-
ter, extreme care must be taken to ensure that the signal
is not overwhelmed by background noise. One way to
deal with this is to increase the signal so much that it is
comparable to the background. This is what is done in
short-baseline reactor detectors [7] and near-field reactor
monitoring detectors [5]. For some applications, how-
ever, the distance between the anti-neutrino source and
the detector must be large. Since the anti-neutrino flux
is inversely proportional to the square of this distance,
the signal rate is tiny in these situations. To make up for
this, the detector must be large and it must have a very
small level of background noise.
There are two main classes of background noise: ra-
dioactivity present in and around the detector, and ra-
dioactivity produced by cosmic ray muons. The level of
the former can be reduced to very low levels, thanks to
decades of experience from numerous neutrino detection
experiments. The latter, however, can only be reduced
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FIG. 1: A map of the thermal power of commercial and research reactors in 5◦ × 5◦ cells on Earth.
by brute force: i.e. by having sufficient shielding mate-
rial, such as rock or water. As a rough rule of thumb
for typical anti-neutrino measurements, two kilometers
of water is barely enough shielding, three kilometers is
satisfactory, and four or more kilometers provides good
shielding. Shielding by rock is very costly unless it is
already present, such as inside of a pre-existing mine.
Indeed, most large anti-neutrino detectors in existence
today are located in commercial mines. For the purpose
of nuclear monitoring, however, it is unlikely in general
that commercial mines would exist in locations where the
detectors need to be placed. Thus, for economic reasons,
the only locations where far-field monitoring detectors
could be placed are in large bodies of water (i.e. oceans,
seas, and large lakes).
V. ANTI-NEUTRINO BACKGROUND
SOURCES
One of the most formidable background sources for nu-
clear monitoring with antinuetrino detectors is the flux
of anti-neutrinos from commercial and research nuclear
reactors around the world. Distributed mostly around
the northern hemisphere, a total thermal power of about
1 TW is produced by these reactors. The distribution
of these reactors is shown in Fig. 1. See Appendix A
for details on the location and power of these reactors.
The number of anti-neutrinos produced by these nuclear
reactors detected per year by a one-megaton detector lo-
cated at various locations on Earth is shown in Fig. 2(a).
anti-neutrinos produced by these reactors are virtually
indistinguishable from those produced by a rogue reac-
tor; if a rogue reactor operates in a region where the
anti-neutrino flux from commercial and research reactors
is high, it would be very difficult to detect.
Another possible source of background is the “geore-
actor”, which is a hypothetical natural nuclear reactor in
the core of the Earth [9, 10, 11, 12, 13]. If it exists, this
reactor is expected to have a radius of several kilometers
and have a thermal power of about 1 to 10 TWth. Since
commercial and research nuclear reactors world wide pro-
duce a total power of about 1 TWth, the existence of a
georeactor would have a large impact on the background
rate for detecting a rogue reactor. This is illustrated in
Fig. 2(b), which is the same as Fig. 2(a), but with a
contribution from a 3 TWth georeactor. The effect of
a georeactor is not particularly serious in much of the
northern hemisphere because the anti-neutrino flux is al-
ready high, but it causes a serious increase in background
in much of the southern hemisphere. For this reason, a
measurement of this background is an important prereq-
uisite for the anti-neutrino detector array being consid-
ered here. A preliminary measurement has already been
carried out by KamLAND [14], but the result is imprecise
because of the large background from commercial nuclear
reactors. However, a detector whose size is comparable to
KamLAND and located far away from commercial reac-
tors can easily make a precise measurement of georeactor
power down to about 1 TWth. Hanohano [15] (Hawaii
anti-neutrino Observatory) is an example of a detector
capable of making this measurement. Like the detectors
in this array, Hanohano will be placed deep in the ocean.
Thus, it is a prototype of the megaton detectors, and the
successful implementation and operation of it would be
an important prerequisite for the rogue activity detector
array concept.
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FIG. 2: The number of events per year (log scale) detected by a one-megaton anti-neutrino detector due to commercial and
research reactors around the world. (a) Assuming no georeactor. (b) Assuming a 3 TWth georeactor.
VI. NEUTRINO OSCILLATIONS
A potentially important detail that must be kept in
mind when considering neutrino detection is neutrino fla-
vor oscillation. The current view of the nature of neutri-
nos is that three “flavors” of neutrinos exist; the flavors
are referred to as the “electron-type”, “muon-type”, and
“tau-type”. An electron-type neutrino turns into an elec-
tron when it interacts with the target via the charged-
current electroweak interaction, while a muon-type neu-
trino is transformed into a muon and similarly with a
tau-type neutrino. The situation with “anti-neutrinos” –
which is the focus of this study – is similar, except that
the out-going particle has the opposite electric charge.
The importance of the above discussion is the fact that
the final state particles – the electron, muon, and the tau
(and their anti-particles) – have very different masses.
The electron, muon, and the tau have, respectively, a
mass of 0.511, 105, and 1777 MeV. A neutrino can only
undergo the charged-current interaction with the target
particle if it carries at least as much energy as the out-
going particle mass.
Recent results of solar and reactor neutrino experi-
ments have unequivocally established the fact that neu-
trinos “oscillate”. For practical purposes, this means that
the neutrino flavor when it is produced is not the same
as when it is detected. In the present context, electron
anti-neutrinos are produced in a nuclear reactor; as these
anti-neutrinos propagate outward, they become a quan-
tum mechanical superposition of different neutrino fla-
vors. Since these anti-neutrinos have energy well below
10 MeV, that part of the superposition that has turned
into a muon- or tau-type neutrino cannot interact with
the target because the available energy is insufficient to
6produce a muon or tau. The result is that the anti-
neutrino detection rate is smaller than is expected in the
absence of neutrino oscillations. The neutrino survival
probability – defined as the fraction of detection rate
compared to the rate without oscillations – is a func-
tion of distance from the reactor. For a threshold en-
ergy of 1.8 MeV, this starts out at 100% for distances
of 0 to several 10s of kilometers. The probability then
oscillates around an asymptotic value of 0.57 as the dis-
tance ranges from about 100 km to 300 km. Beyond this,
the amplitude of the oscillation approaches zero, and the
probability is practically indistinguishable from 0.57.
In this study, we consider two cases: regional monitor-
ing (section VII) and global monitoring (section VIII). In
the former, the variation of the survival probability with
distance affects the result of performance studies, so this
has been taken into account in all figures and results. In
the latter, the effect of oscillation was implemented by
simply scaling the no-oscillation rate by 0.57. This sim-
plification is valid because we are only interested in how
the detector array performs as a group spanning many
thousands of kilometers. In other words, in the global
scheme, we are not interested in how well several near-
by detectors perform (which is covered in the regional
scheme), but in how well many hundreds of widely sep-
arated detectors perform. We have established that, for
the global scheme, the asymptotic approximation of the
survival probability is accurate to within a fraction of a
percent.
VII. REGIONAL MONITORING
As an example of the capability of a megaton-scale ar-
ray of anti-neutrino detectors for the purpose of detecting
rogue nuclear activity, we consider a scenario in which
rogue activity is taking place in North Korea. To make
the illustration concrete, it was assumed that the rogue
reactor is located deep inside of North Korean territory
at longitude 127.0◦ E and latitude 40.5◦ N (Fig. 3(a)).
North Korea presents a realistic test case not only be-
cause of recent events, but also because of the fact that
it does not operate any nuclear reactors legally. If this
were not the case, the monitoring regime presented here
would be easily defeated because the rogue reactor could
be placed close to a legally operated reactor, which would
obscure this activity. Thus this monitoring regime would
not be realistic for monitoring rogue activities in South
Korea or Japan, or any nation with legally operating nu-
clear reactors.
The choice of location of anti-neutrino detectors should
be based on the sensitivity to rogue reactor detection.
Fig. 3 (a) shows the number of events deteced by a 1-
megaton detector exposed for one year, assuming the
rogue reactor power is 100 MWth.
Fig. 3 (b) shows the number of background events,
mostly from commercial nuclear reactors in South Ko-
rea and Japan. The sensitivity of a detector depends on
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FIG. 3: The signal and background from a 100 MWth rogue
reactor deep in North Korean territory (127.0◦ E longitude,
latitude 40.5◦ N latitude). (a) The signal S, defined as the
number of anti-neutrino events detected by a 1-megaton de-
tector exposed for one year. (b) The background B, defined
as above, but the source of anti-neutrinos are all commercial
and research reactors around the world; the vast majority of
detected background comes from reactors in South Korea and
Japan. (c) The signal significance S/
√
S +B. The dots are
candidate location of the 1-megaton detectors. Eash loca-
tion was chosen based on the value of the significance, whose
contours are not circular because of distortions from the back-
ground.
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expected events with the mean number of events that would be observed for the true reactor position; the comparison was
quantified using the χ2 technique. At each longitude and latitude, χ2 was minimized with respect to the rogue reactor power.
The contours correspond to the 68, 90, 95, and 99% confidence level contour for two free parameters (longitude and latitude).
the signal S and the background B according to the for-
mula S/
√
S +B. Twenty-three candidate locations were
chosen based on the sensitivity contour (Fig. 3 (c)). We
assumed, of course, that the detector must be located in
the ocean for cosmic ray shielding. We did not consider
the feasibility of the candidate locations from the point of
view of political boundaries, depth, or ease of sabotage.
The general outline of the monitoring regime proceeds
as follows. First, detectors are placed in several loca-
tions around North Korea. In our simulations, we ex-
amined array configurations with two to four detectors,
the location of which was chosen from the 23 shown in
Fig. 3 (c). Of course, we do not know the rogue reac-
tor locaion a priori, but North Korea is not such a big
territory, so the exact choice of locations should not mat-
ter so long as the detectors are reasonably close to land.
Second, the detectors take data for about one year. Dur-
ing this exposure period, it receives background events
from commercial reactors, but the expected level can be
calculated accurately using data provided by the reactor
operators. Finally, one compares the observed number of
events in each detector to the expected number of back-
ground events. If a significant excess is observed in any
of the detectors, an alarm is raised and one would then
use the data from all the detectors to try to triangulate
the location of the rogue activity. At the same time, po-
litical action would commence against the rogue regime.
The statistical technique used in the comparison of the
data against the background expectation is described in
detail in Appendix B.
The quantity P99 (defined in detail in Appendix B)
stands for the threshold rogue reactor thermal power
that triggers an alarm at the “99%” confidence level.
Fig. 4 shows an array configuration with four detectors
for which P99 = 128 MWth. To quantify the ability of the
array to pin-point the reactor, a map of ∆χ2 was made
(Fig. 4). This map was made by comparing the observed
number of events (sum of signal and background) in each
detector with the number of expected events for a hy-
pothetical rogue reactor at different locations and power
levels. At each location, the power was varied until the χ2
between the observed and expected set of events was min-
imized. As one would expect, the smallest minimized χ2
occurs at the true reactor location; ∆χ2 is defined as the
difference between this smallest minimized χ2 and that
at any given location in the map (by definition, ∆χ2 = 0
at the true location). The contours shown in the ∆χ2
map indicate the range of likely reconstructed positions
at the specified confidence level. In other words, an X-%
contour indicates that there is an X-% chance that the
reconstructed position would lie within the contour.
There are several notable features in Fig. 4. First is
the fact that each detector strongly rules out a circular
region of radius of several 10s km. Second is the fact that
the alarm level P99 is determined almost completely by
the closest detector. The addition of the other detectors
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FIG. 5: The three array configurations considered in the world-wide monitoring regime. Top: detector modules distributed
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another. Bottom: modules distributed to hug coastlines; they are approximately 100 km from land, and 100 km from each
other. The number of modules in each array are 1596, 623, and 1482. The final results were normalized so that the total
detector mass is equal to 1596 modules’ worth.
do not lower the alarm level (i.e. they do not improve
the sensitivity); their role is to help pin-point the location
of the rogue reactor. To see this, note that if only the
closest detector were present, the minimum χ2 would be
an annular region around it; the other detectors strongly
rule out circular regions surrounding their locations, thus
narrowing down the possible locations.
We finally note that nuclear reactors need to be cooled;
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FIG. 6: Map of P99 for the three array configurations shown in Fig. 5. The power is in units of MWth. The number of detector
modules in each array is different between arrays, but the total mass has been scaled to 1596 times 10 megatons ≈ 16 gigatons.
The target power of P99 < 100 MWth is indicated by the white areas.
reactors located inland are cooled with a river or a lake.
Thus the intersection of rivers and lakes with the confi-
dence region discussed above would allow one to focus in
on possible reactor sites.
VIII. GLOBAL MONITORING
More ambitious in objective than regional monitoring
is a global monitoring regime, the goal of which is to
monitor all locations on Earth. Unlike the regional mon-
itoring case, one cannot optimize resources to focus in on
a suspect region, so the size requirements are very de-
manding. First, detector modules need to be an order of
magnitude larger than in the regional monitoring case –
i.e. each module is 10 megatons, which corresponds to a
cube of sides 216 m. This is about the limiting size of a
detector module from the point of view of light detection
efficiency because even in extremely pure water, light has
a maximum attenuation length of about 100 m [6]. Thus
light produced in the center of the detector is attenuated
by about a factor of 0.40; such events would be detected
with low efficiency with any detector that is significantly
larger. Also, the number of modules in an array needs to
be on the order of 1000. As before, we took the exposure
time to be one year. We considered three different array
configurations in our study, shown in Fig. 5. To measure
the performance of the arrays, a map of P99 was made
(see Appendix B). In other words, a rogue reactor was
assumed to exist in various locations on Earth. For each
location, the rogue reactor power was varied until the re-
actor was detectable at the “99%” confidence level. The
maps show that in most costal regions (i.e. within several
hundred kilometers of the shore), the array is sensitive to
rogue reactor power of several hundred MWth. The sen-
sitivity worsens to about 1000 MWth for regions with a
high level of legal nuclear activity. The sensitivity wors-
ens yet to almost 2000 MWth deep within continents.
Since rogue reactors, realistically, should have a power of
less than about 100 MWth, it is seen that the world-wide
monitoring regime considered here does not measure up
well to the task at hand.
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FIG. 7: Map of Y99 for the array configuration shown in the top of Fig. 5. The target sensitivity is less than 1 kton, which is
indicated by the white boxes.
IX. MONITORING OF FISSION BOMB
DETONATION
The energy production mechanism of a fission bomb
is basically the same as that of a nuclear reactor. The
main difference is that the latter operate in a steady-
state mode, while the former releases its energy in a short
burst. Most of the anti-neutrinos from a fission bomb are
released in 10 seconds from the moment of detonation.
The anti-neutrino yield from a 1 kton bomb observed by
a 1 megaton detector at 100 km from ground-zero is 2.25
events (Eqn. 3). This may seem like a small number,
but one must consider the fact that the amount of back-
ground is reduced greatly by the fact that the observation
time is ten seconds. A study of the sensitivity of a global
array was carried out as in the case for rogue reactors
(section VIII). In this case, a map of “Y99” was made in-
stead of P99, where Y99 is the yield of a fission bomb that
can be detected at the 99% confidence level, as defined
in Appendix B. The result is shown in Fig. 7. Unfortu-
nately, at most places on Earth, the sensitivity is several
kilotons, compared to the goal of one kiloton. However,
since the goal is not too far off, one may achieve the goal
by targeting to certain regions (though not going down
quite to the regional scale like for North Korea), or by
loosening the alarm threshold.
X. COST
Here, only a very rough estimate of the cost of the ar-
rays will be attempted. The main costs involve: (1) pho-
tomultiplier tubes (PMTs), (2) detector material, civil
engineering, transport, etc., (3) water purification, (4)
gadolinium dopant, and (5) man-power. The PMT cost
is fairly well-understood. If we assume the same cov-
erage as the Super-Kamiokande detector (about 40% of
the detector wall area), assuming that the same PMTs
as Super-Kamiokande will be used, and assuming that
the cost per PMT will be about $1000 (assuming that
bulk-discount or economy of scale reduces the price per
PMT), about 120,000 PMT will be required per detec-
tor module. This translates to 120 million dollars per
detector. The material, civil engineering, transport, etc.
cost is not well-known at this point, but probably sev-
eral hundred million dollars per module is the right order
of magnitude. The cost of water purification is also not
known right now, but probably about 100 million dol-
lars is the right order of magnitude. Several thousand
tons of GdCl3 per module is required; at $3 per kilo-
gram, this translates to several million dollars, which is
negligible compared to the total cost. Man-power and ev-
erything else is quite vague, but something on the order
of $100 million is probably the right order of magnitude.
In total, then, each detector module will probably cost
about $1 billion. This implies that a regional monitoring
scheme would cost several billion dollars. In contrast, a
11
world monitoring regime will cost several trillion dollars.
XI. CONCLUSION
Our study shows that targeted regional monitoring of
rogue nuclear reactor activity in a nation without pre-
existing legally operated nuclear reactor may be done at
a cost of several billion dollars, provided that the na-
tion has significant coast lines facing large bodies of wa-
ter. We note, however, that the cost accounting is very
rough, and that several key features of the scheme have
yet to be proved feasible. For instance, the idea [8] of
doping a water-based detector with gadolinium to make
it sensitive to reactor anti-neutrinos is promising, but yet
unproven. The verdict should be out in the next several
years as Super-Kamiokande starts its third experimen-
tal phase this year (2006). Another unproven scheme is
the deploying of a KamLAND-like detector in a deep-
sea environment. Hanohano appears to be the single ex-
periment that will test this idea in the coming decade.
Finally, the idea of deploying a megaton-scale detector
is unproven. Ideas to construct detectors on this scale
exist (e.g. Hyper-K and UNO), but there are no sched-
ules for building any. Moreover, these detectors are to
be deployed on land, which probably simplifies matters
considerably compared to deploying it deep in the ocean.
The more ambitious idea of an untargeted world-wide ar-
ray was studied, but it mostly did not reach the target
sensitivity of about 100 MWth for reactors nor the 1 kilo-
ton yield for fission bombs. This was at a prohibitive cost
of more than trillion dollars. Thus it is concluded that
an untargeted world-wide monitoring scheme is unrealis-
tic. A viable monitoring scheme must focus in on some
region in order to optimize resources.
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APPENDIX A: A LIST OF NUCLEAR REACTOR
LOCATION AND POWER
This appendix gives a list of the location (longitude
and latitude) and the nominal thermal power of regis-
tered nuclear reactors throughout the world. The list was
obtained in 2003 from the International Nuclear Safety
Center [19]. The list may not be up to date, and the posi-
tions are only approximate. Our results, however, do not
depend sensitively on the exact world wide distribution
of nuclear reactors, nor on the relatively small change in
the total nuclear power world wide since 2003, so this
should be sufficient for the purpose of this study. A to-
tal of 433 reactors are in the list, and the total thermal
power is 1.06 TWth. This list will be provided in ASCII
format upon request to ehguillian@gmail.com.
APPENDIX B: THE STATISTICAL TECHNIQUE
USED TO COMPARE THE OBSERVED
NUMBER OF EVENTS AGAINST THE
EXPECTED NUMBER
Let us say that there are Ndet detectors in the array.
In the absence of any rogue reactor, detector number i
detects bi events per year; these are from commercial and
research reactors, and (possibly) from the georeactor in
Earth’s core. We denote the set of observed number of
events b1, b2, . . . bNdet by the usual “set” notation {bi}.
The actually observed number of events in each detec-
tor is represented as {ni}. In the absence of rogue activ-
ity, the numbers in {ni} should agree with those in {bi}.
If, however, rogue activity is taking place, the predicted
numbers {bi} is incorrect, and it should be replaced with
{bi + si}, where si represents the number of events in
detector number i due to the rogue activity.
The method used to detect rogue activity starts with
the assumption that no rogue activity is taking place, so
that the predicted number of events at each detector is
given by {bi}. The set of observed number of events is
compared against the observed number {ni} using a like-
lihood function; as the name suggests, this function pro-
vides information about how likely a set of numbers {ni}
is to have resulted from the predicted set {bi}, given sta-
tistical and systematic uncertainties. For this report, we
considered only statistical uncertainty, in which case the
logarithm of the likelihood function (the log-likelihood
function) is defined as follows:
L = −bi + ni ln bi − ln Γ(ni + 1) (B1)
The last term lnΓ(ni+1) is the logarithm of the Gamma
function.
The value of L for a given measurement (lasting
one year) is not known a priori because of statistical
fluctuations, although the mean expected value 〈L〉 is
(Fig. 8 (a)). The mean expected value, in fact, depends
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Reactor Thermal Latitude Longitude (E) Reactor Thermal Latitude Longitude (E)
Number Power (MW) Number Power (MW)
1 1375 40.166 44.133 61 2894 39.200 -0.633
2 1100 -34.000 -59.250 62 3027 40.702 -2.379
3 2103 -32.233 -64.449 63 510 40.350 -2.883
4 1192 51.316 4.266 64 1 42.766 -3.200
5 1192 51.316 4.266 65 2686 39.807 -5.696
6 2775 51.316 4.266 66 2696 39.807 -5.696
7 2988 51.316 4.266 67 2686 41.200 0.566
8 2660 50.533 5.266 68 2686 41.200 0.566
9 2775 50.533 5.266 69 2785 40.966 0.883
10 2988 50.533 5.266 70 2000 61.233 21.450
11 1375 43.750 23.633 71 2000 61.233 21.450
12 1375 43.750 23.633 72 1375 60.366 26.366
13 1375 43.750 23.633 73 1375 60.366 26.366
14 1375 43.750 23.633 74 2785 45.260 -0.688
15 1882 -23.000 -44.450 75 2785 45.260 -0.688
16 2156 45.066 -66.450 76 2785 45.260 -0.688
17 2180 46.400 -72.316 77 2785 45.260 -0.688
18 2774 43.883 -78.750 78 3817 49.535 -1.881
19 2774 43.883 -78.750 79 3817 49.535 -1.881
20 2774 43.883 -78.750 80 2785 47.229 0.167
21 2774 43.883 -78.750 81 2785 47.229 0.167
22 1754 43.816 -79.066 82 2905 47.229 0.167
23 1754 43.816 -79.066 83 2905 47.229 0.167
24 1754 43.816 -79.066 84 3817 49.858 0.633
25 1754 43.816 -79.066 85 3817 49.858 0.633
26 2832 44.333 -81.600 86 3817 49.858 0.633
27 2832 44.333 -81.600 87 3817 49.858 0.633
28 2832 44.333 -81.600 88 4250 46.457 0.659
29 2832 44.333 -81.600 89 3817 44.106 0.849
30 947 46.966 7.266 90 3817 44.106 0.849
31 2806 47.366 7.966 91 3817 49.975 1.211
32 3012 47.583 8.149 92 3817 49.975 1.211
33 1130 47.550 8.216 93 2785 47.720 1.579
34 1130 47.550 8.216 94 2785 47.720 1.579
35 2905 22.600 114.533 95 2785 51.016 2.144
36 2905 22.600 114.533 96 2785 51.016 2.144
37 966 30.450 120.933 97 2785 51.016 2.144
38 1375 49.083 16.133 98 2785 51.016 2.144
39 1375 49.083 16.133 99 2785 51.016 2.144
40 1375 49.083 16.133 100 2785 51.016 2.144
41 1375 49.083 16.133 101 2785 47.733 2.516
42 3765 49.983 10.183 102 2785 47.733 2.516
43 3840 48.516 10.400 103 2785 47.733 2.516
44 3840 48.516 10.400 104 2785 47.733 2.516
45 3690 53.400 10.433 105 3817 47.507 2.877
46 2575 48.600 12.300 106 3817 47.507 2.877
47 3765 48.600 12.300 107 3817 48.517 3.520
48 3850 52.466 7.316 108 3817 48.517 3.520
49 3517 49.716 8.416 109 563 44.816 4.700
50 3733 49.716 8.416 110 2785 44.329 4.732
51 2575 49.250 8.450 111 2785 44.329 4.732
52 3850 49.250 8.450 112 2785 44.329 4.732
53 3733 53.433 8.466 113 2785 44.329 4.732
54 1050 49.366 9.083 114 2785 44.631 4.755
55 2292 53.916 9.116 115 2785 44.631 4.755
56 2497 49.033 9.166 116 2785 44.631 4.755
57 3850 49.033 9.166 117 2785 44.631 4.755
58 3765 53.850 9.350 118 3817 45.405 4.755
59 3765 52.033 9.416 119 3817 45.405 4.755
60 1892 53.616 9.533 120 4270 50.090 4.789
TABLE I: A list of registered nuclear reactors world wide.
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Reactor Thermal Latitude Longitude (E) Reactor Thermal Latitude Longitude (E)
Number Power (MW) Number Power (MW)
121 4270 50.090 4.789 181 3293 37.416 138.600
122 2785 45.795 5.270 182 3293 37.416 138.600
123 2785 45.795 5.270 183 3293 37.416 138.600
124 2785 45.795 5.270 184 3926 37.416 138.600
125 2785 45.795 5.270 185 3926 37.416 138.600
126 3817 49.413 6.216 186 1650 43.033 140.516
127 3817 49.413 6.216 187 1650 43.033 140.516
128 3817 49.413 6.216 188 3293 36.461 140.610
129 3817 49.413 6.216 189 1380 37.416 141.000
130 2660 47.906 7.565 190 2381 37.416 141.000
131 2660 47.906 7.565 191 2381 37.416 141.000
132 1375 46.572 18.854 192 2381 37.416 141.000
133 1375 46.572 18.854 193 2381 37.416 141.000
134 1375 46.572 18.854 194 3293 37.416 141.000
135 1375 46.572 18.854 195 3293 37.316 141.033
136 660 19.833 72.700 196 3293 37.316 141.033
137 660 19.833 72.700 197 3293 37.316 141.033
138 802 21.266 73.400 198 3293 37.316 141.033
139 801 21.266 73.400 199 1593 38.400 141.500
140 801 14.866 74.450 200 2436 38.400 141.500
141 801 14.866 74.450 201 2775 35.500 126.416
142 693 24.883 75.633 202 2775 35.500 126.416
143 694 24.883 75.633 203 2825 35.500 126.416
144 801 28.183 78.366 204 2825 35.500 126.416
145 801 28.183 78.366 205 1928 35.333 129.333
146 801 12.583 80.183 206 1876 35.333 129.333
147 801 12.583 80.183 207 2775 35.333 129.333
148 1650 33.516 129.833 208 2775 35.333 129.333
149 1650 33.516 129.833 209 2775 37.100 129.383
150 3423 33.516 129.833 210 2775 37.100 129.383
151 3423 33.516 129.833 211 2825 37.100 129.383
152 2660 31.833 130.200 212 2825 37.100 129.383
153 2660 31.833 130.200 213 2156 35.750 129.500
154 1650 33.483 132.316 214 2169 35.750 129.500
155 1650 33.483 132.316 215 1000 44.600 50.300
156 2660 33.483 132.316 216 4800 55.600 26.483
157 1380 35.533 133.000 217 4800 55.600 26.483
158 2436 35.533 133.000 218 1931 19.725 -96.387
159 2440 35.516 135.500 219 1931 19.725 -96.387
160 2440 35.516 135.500 220 1366 51.433 3.716
161 2660 35.516 135.500 221 433 24.866 66.789
162 2660 35.516 135.500 222 2180 44.316 28.016
163 3423 35.533 135.650 223 62 68.033 166.250
164 3423 35.533 135.650 224 62 68.033 166.250
165 3423 35.533 135.650 225 62 68.033 166.250
166 3423 35.533 135.650 226 62 68.033 166.250
167 1031 35.683 135.966 227 3200 59.500 29.050
168 1456 35.683 135.966 228 3200 59.500 29.050
169 2440 35.683 135.966 229 3200 59.500 29.050
170 714 35.766 136.000 230 3200 59.500 29.050
171 557 35.750 136.016 231 1375 67.466 32.466
172 1064 35.747 136.022 232 1375 67.466 32.466
173 3411 35.747 136.022 233 1375 67.466 32.466
174 1593 37.050 136.733 234 1375 67.466 32.466
175 1593 34.616 138.150 235 3200 54.166 33.233
176 2436 34.616 138.150 236 3200 54.166 33.233
177 3293 34.616 138.150 237 3200 54.166 33.233
178 3293 34.616 138.150 238 3000 57.916 35.083
179 3293 37.416 138.600 239 3000 57.916 35.083
180 3293 37.416 138.600 240 3200 51.683 35.616
TABLE II: A list of registered nuclear reactors world wide (continued).
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Reactor Thermal Latitude Longitude (E) Reactor Thermal Latitude Longitude (E)
Number Power (MW) Number Power (MW)
241 3200 51.683 35.616 301 1555 54.033 -2.916
242 3200 51.683 35.616 302 947 51.200 -3.133
243 3200 51.683 35.616 303 947 51.200 -3.133
244 1375 51.283 39.216 304 1500 51.200 -3.133
245 1375 51.283 39.216 305 1500 51.200 -3.133
246 3000 51.283 39.216 306 260 55.016 -3.216
247 3000 51.916 47.366 307 260 55.016 -3.216
248 3000 51.916 47.366 308 260 55.016 -3.216
249 3000 51.916 47.366 309 260 55.016 -3.216
250 3000 51.916 47.366 310 270 54.416 -3.483
251 60 54.233 49.616 311 270 54.416 -3.483
252 150 54.233 49.616 312 270 54.416 -3.483
253 1470 56.850 61.316 313 270 54.416 -3.483
254 2270 57.250 12.116 314 1496 54.416 -3.483
255 2440 57.250 12.116 315 1496 54.416 -3.483
256 2775 57.250 12.116 316 1760 53.416 -4.483
257 2775 57.250 12.116 317 1730 53.416 -4.483
258 1800 55.700 12.916 318 780 50.550 0.580
259 1375 57.416 16.666 319 780 50.550 0.580
260 1800 57.416 16.666 320 1550 50.550 0.580
261 3300 57.416 16.666 321 1550 50.550 0.580
262 2928 60.400 18.166 322 500 51.750 0.883
263 2928 60.400 18.166 323 500 51.750 0.883
264 3200 60.400 18.166 324 800 52.200 1.616
265 1876 45.916 15.533 325 800 52.200 1.616
266 1375 48.500 17.683 326 3411 52.200 1.616
267 1375 48.500 17.683 327 3817 33.390 -112.862
268 1375 48.500 17.683 328 3817 33.390 -112.862
269 1375 48.500 17.683 329 3817 33.390 -112.862
270 1375 48.250 18.450 330 3390 33.370 -117.557
271 1375 48.250 18.450 331 3390 33.370 -117.557
272 2785 21.966 120.733 332 3323 46.471 -119.333
273 2785 21.966 120.733 333 3338 35.212 -120.854
274 1775 25.300 121.583 334 3411 35.212 -120.854
275 1775 25.300 121.583 335 1998 41.944 -70.579
276 2894 25.200 121.666 336 3411 42.898 -70.851
277 2894 25.200 121.666 337 2700 41.309 -72.168
278 1375 51.333 25.883 338 3579 41.309 -72.168
279 1375 51.333 25.883 339 1593 42.780 -72.516
280 3000 51.333 25.883 340 3071 41.271 -73.953
281 3000 50.600 26.550 341 3025 41.271 -73.953
282 3200 51.383 30.100 342 1930 39.814 -74.206
283 3000 47.816 31.216 343 3411 39.463 -75.536
284 3000 47.816 31.216 344 3411 39.463 -75.536
285 3000 47.816 31.216 345 3293 39.468 -75.538
286 3200 47.483 34.633 346 3293 40.220 -75.590
287 3200 47.483 34.633 347 3293 40.220 -75.590
288 3200 47.483 34.633 348 3293 41.092 -76.149
289 3200 47.483 34.633 349 3293 41.092 -76.149
290 3200 47.483 34.633 350 3293 39.759 -76.269
291 3200 47.483 34.633 351 3293 39.759 -76.269
292 1500 54.650 -1.183 352 2436 43.524 -76.398
293 1500 54.650 -1.183 353 1850 43.522 -76.410
294 1555 55.966 -2.516 354 3323 43.522 -76.410
295 1555 55.966 -2.516 355 2700 38.435 -76.442
296 893 51.650 -2.566 356 2700 38.435 -76.442
297 893 51.650 -2.566 357 2441 37.166 -76.698
298 1500 54.033 -2.916 358 2441 37.166 -76.698
299 1500 54.033 -2.916 359 2568 40.153 -76.725
300 1556 54.033 -2.916 360 1520 43.292 -77.309
TABLE III: A list of registered nuclear reactors world wide (continued).
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Reactor Thermal Latitude Longitude (E) Reactor Thermal Latitude Longitude (E)
Number Power (MW) Number Power (MW)
361 2893 38.061 -77.791 421 2568 35.227 -93.231
362 2893 38.061 -77.791 422 2815 35.227 -93.231
363 2416 33.958 -78.011 423 1670 45.333 -93.848
364 2436 33.958 -78.011 424 2381 40.362 -95.641
365 2775 35.633 -78.956 425 3411 38.239 -95.689
366 2300 34.405 -80.159 426 3817 28.795 -96.048
367 2700 27.349 -80.246 427 3817 28.795 -96.048
368 2700 27.349 -80.246 428 1500 41.521 -96.077
369 2200 25.435 -80.331 429 3411 32.298 -97.785
370 2200 25.435 -80.331 430 3411 32.298 -97.785
371 2652 40.622 -80.434 431 2775 -33.650 18.416
372 2652 40.622 -80.434 432 2775 -33.650 18.416
373 3411 35.432 -80.948 433 0 40.166 44.133
374 3411 35.432 -80.948
375 3411 35.051 -81.069
376 3411 35.051 -81.069
377 3579 41.801 -81.143
378 2775 34.296 -81.320
379 3565 33.142 -81.765
380 3565 33.142 -81.765
381 2436 31.934 -82.344
382 2436 31.934 -82.344
383 2544 28.957 -82.699
384 2568 34.792 -82.899
385 2568 34.792 -82.899
386 2568 34.792 -82.899
387 2772 41.597 -83.086
388 3292 41.963 -83.259
389 3411 35.603 -84.790
390 3411 35.223 -85.088
391 3411 35.223 -85.088
392 2652 31.223 -85.112
393 2652 31.223 -85.112
394 2530 42.322 -86.315
395 3250 41.976 -86.566
396 3411 41.976 -86.566
397 3293 34.704 -87.119
398 3293 34.704 -87.119
399 3292 34.704 -87.119
400 1518 44.281 -87.536
401 1518 44.281 -87.536
402 1650 44.343 -87.536
403 3411 41.244 -88.229
404 3411 41.244 -88.229
405 2527 41.390 -88.271
406 2527 41.390 -88.271
407 3323 41.244 -88.671
408 3323 41.244 -88.671
409 2894 40.172 -88.834
410 3411 42.075 -89.282
411 3411 42.075 -89.282
412 2511 41.726 -90.310
413 2511 41.726 -90.310
414 3410 29.995 -90.471
415 3833 32.008 -91.048
416 2894 30.757 -91.332
417 1658 42.101 -91.777
418 3565 38.758 -91.782
419 1650 44.619 -92.633
420 1650 44.619 -92.633
TABLE IV: A list of registered nuclear reactors world wide (continued).
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on the power P of the rogue reactor; we denote this de-
pendence as 〈L〉 (P ). As the power increases, the assump-
tion that no rogue reactor exists becomes increasingly
inconsistent with observations; this inconsistency causes
〈L〉 to be biased to lower values. When P is small, the
slightly biased distribution of 〈L〉 (P ) largely overlaps the
distribution of 〈L〉 (0), which implies that the detector ar-
ray is not sensitive enough to detect such a low value of
P (Fig. 8 (b)). However, as the power is raised, a point is
reached where the two distributions are different enough
that the rogue reactor can be judged to exist with great
confidence (Fig. 8 (c)).
For the purpose of identifying a rogue reactor, a thresh-
old level of the log-likelihood value for triggering an alarm
is necessary. If this is set too close to 〈L〉 (0), the observed
value of 〈L〉 would easily trigger a false-positive alarm
just from statistical fluctuations. For the purpose of the
present study, we decided to tolerate a 1% false-positive
probability (Fig. 8 (c)). Once this threshold is set, we
can talk about the sensitivity of an array. We quantified
this with P99, which is the rogue reactor power that has a
99% chance of clearing the alarm threshold. Since rogue
reactors are not likely to be much larger than 100 MWth,
a promising detector array should have P99 at this level.
Of course, the tolerance for false-positives and -negatives
chosen here are arbitrary; looser tolerance would result
in sensitivity to lower power, but at the cost of greater
chance of mis-identification and missing an actually ex-
isting reactor.
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FIG. 8: Illustrating how the log-likelihood distribution
changes with rogue reactor power. (a) When no rogue re-
actor exists, the data agree well with the assumption, so that
the mean log-likelihood value 〈L〉 (0) is high. Any given mea-
surement is distributed around the mean due to statistical
fluctuations. (b) As the rogue reactor power increases to P ,
the mean value 〈L〉 (P ) decreases. However, P is small so
the distribution at this power largely overlaps with the dis-
tribution at zero power, which means that the detector array
is not sensitive enough to confidently detect the rogue reac-
tor. (c) When the rogue reactor power is sufficiently large,
the overlap between the distributions become very small, and
the existence of the reactor can be confirmed with great con-
fidence. The power P99 is defined as the power above which
there is 99% chance that the likelihood value will be above the
alarm threshold, which is defined as the log-likelihood value
below which there is only 1% chance for a “false positive”.
We note that the width of the distribution increases slowly
with power.
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